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What Made the Kádár Era? Two Books on Hungary’s Recent Past 
Népuralom ötvenhatban [People’s Rule in ’56]. By Éva Standeisky. 
Pozsony–Budapest: Kalligram–1956-os Intézet, 2010. 597 pp. 
Bevezetés a kádárizmusba [Introduction to Kádárism]. By János Rainer M. 
Budapest: 1956-os Intézet–L’Harmattan Kiadó, 2011. 352 pp.
Hungary has its own extensive literature on the era of  state socialism, with a 
steady stream of  monographs (re)assessing the whole of  the period. Previously 
well-established ideas on the state and society of  state socialism have come 
under review in recent years. The approaches of  social and cultural history and 
the history of  mentality are gradually making inroads into the study of  recent 
history in this country. The assessment of  the Kádár era has become a question 
of  heightened interest in the last few years. The limits of  power, the scope 
ordinary people had for action (including against the system) and how these 
shaped the world and everyday life of  state socialism are among the fundamental 
questions of  interest on the state socialist system and the Kádár era.
No assessment of  the Kádár era can completely dissociate it from 1956 and 
the period that preceded it, the Stalinist Rákosi era. Books on the events of  the 
1956 Revolution have proliferated in Hungary since the political transition. Éva 
Standeisky’s Népuralom ötvenhatban stands out among these. The author examines 
the aims that motivated the everyday participants in 1956 and the individual 
and collective actions which shaped the historical events. She takes a history-of-
mentality approach to the events of  the Revolution, assembling and interpreting 
data that has already been published, and focusing on individual cases and local 
events. Although to a large extent building on previous political-history and local-
history treatments, the book examines the mentalities in the background of  the 
events from close up. The scale changes several times from chapter to chapter, 
progressing from the mass to the group and then to the individual, and giving 
an insight into the Revolution from a micro-history perspective. These changes 
in viewpoint in themselves set the book apart from the idealized accounts of  
the Revolution familiar in general history books and from the image of  1956 
constructed in the West.
Foreign accounts of  the Revolution were heavily influenced by the work of  
Hannah Arendt. In the second edition of  her book on totalitarianism, Arendt 
wrote about the workers’ councils set up in the Hungarian Revolution. These 
have been widely interpreted in Western left-wing accounts as repositories of  the 
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revolutionary will (the aims of  the “working class”). Several, following Arendt,5 
described Hungary’s Revolution as a workers’ revolution against a totalitarian 
regime which called itself  a workers’ state. Bill Lomax directly described the 
Hungarian revolutionary workers’ organizations as a self-administering state of  
workers’ councils.6 
By contrast, Standeisky shows the diversity of  organizations which sprang 
up (revolutionary committees, national committees, national councils, workers’ 
councils, etc.). She sees the collapse of  the dictatorial regime as a state of  grace 
that gave people the chance to produce truly democratic arrangements, setting 
up new organizations at a local level and at their own initiative. She argues that 
direct democracy (or more precisely various spontaneous forms of  that) can truly 
work in extraordinary circumstances, because of  the special ability of  ordinary 
people to create a meaningful and workable order—at least temporarily. This, in 
the interpretation given in the book, is what happened in Hungary in 1956. At 
one point, she says of  the achievements of  ordinary people: “they put the world 
that had fallen apart during the Rákosi dictatorship back together: they created 
real people’s power, and order” (p.272).
Despite being based on a selection of  individual events, the account 
of  the Revolution is not overly idealized or one-sided, because it makes the 
diversity of  these events very clear, and presents some less-known features of  
the Revolution, such as manifestations of  anti-Semitism and lynchings. Hannah 
Arendt claimed in her classic work that there was almost no robbery or looting 
in 1956, i.e. mob rule did not take hold. Relying on published sources, Standeisky 
presents some of  the more carnival-like moments of  the Revolution. She shows 
that revolutionary and workers’ councils did not form immediately, and all kinds 
of  things happened from day to day. It is not easy to confront or convey the 
dark side of  1956 in Hungary. As recently as 2006, a play written by András 
Papp and János Térey for the fiftieth anniversary raised a storm of  controversy.7 
Kazamaták is the stage “adaptation” of  a notorious historical event, the siege of  
a Communist Party headquarters building in Köztársaság Square. It confronted 
informed public opinion with a different face of  the 1956. The rebels besieged 
5  Hannah Arendt, “Epilogue: Reflections on the Hungarian Revolution” in idem, The Origins of  
Totalitarianism (New York: Meridian Books, 1958), 480–510.
6  Bill Lomax, Hungary 1956 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1976); Bill Lomax, ed., Hungarian Workers’ 
Councils in 1956 (Boulder, Colo.: Social Science Monographs, 1990). For the latest criticism of  this view, see 
Mark Pittaway, The Workers’ State: Industrial Labor and the Making of  Socialist Hungary, 1944–1958 (Pittsburgh: 
University of  Pittsburgh Press, 2012), 230–56.
7  András Papp and János Térey, “Kazamaták,” Holmi 18, no. 3 (2006): 292–383.
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and occupied the building of  the Budapest Party Committee on 30 October 
1956 and killed 24 people. Among the dead was the Communist leader Imre 
Mező, a supporter of  Imre Nagy. Standeisky distances herself  from those who 
see that event as a “people’s judgement”, and describes such phenomena as “the 
inflamed mass brutally taking out its anger—a lynching” (p.53). Occasionally, 
even myth-busting stories turn out not to displace the myths so neatly. Éva 
Tulipán’s recent book, which treats the events of  Köztársaság Square in great 
detail, tells us that one reason for the siege of  the party building may have been 
that the Communist Party was actually trying to organize security there. The 
security forces inside had clashed with the rebels several times in the days leading 
up to the siege, and the defenders of  the building used firearms for the first time 
on 30 October.8 Thus a variety of  assessments and judgements are possible for 
every individual and collective action, not just the larger events.
Retrospective social awareness has conditioned us to see the Revolution as 
a fight between good and bad, and Papp and Térey’s play was the first since the 
political transition to confront a wide public with how complex the events of  the 
Revolution actually were. The idea that “goodies” can sometimes behave badly is 
somewhat jarring. The closing line of  the play, “The single story disintegrates/
Into one thousand, nine hundred and fifty-six pieces” is a wry pun: the word for 
“piece” in Hungarian also means “stage play”. Returning to Standeisky’s book, 
we read that every individual and group action has its own special driving force, 
behind which we can recognize the general characteristics of  human nature. 
These driving forces, from the evidence of  this book, seem to be autonomy 
and love of  freedom. This hardly differs from Hannah Arendt’s insight that the 
antidote to totalitarianism is spontaneity, the capability of  autonomous action, 
which totalitarian systems try to eliminate, but exists in everybody. But here, 
individual and community autonomy takes its meaning in democracy, and not 
within the Marxist ideal of  revolution.
Standeisky’s book seems to tell us that in the individual and group actions 
behind the events of  1956, the force which stood in opposition to dictatorship 
and everything associated with it was the freedom-seeking spirit inherent in 
modern society. (The Western treatments quoted assessed the totalitarian system 
against Marxist ideals, whereas here the moral gauge, or rather the counterpoint, 
is democracy, which the author claims showed up in 1956 as the alternative to 
8  Éva Tulipán, Szigorúan ellenőrzött emlékezet. A Köztársaság téri ostrom 1956-ban [Closely Observed Memory. 
The Köztársaság Square Siege in 1956] (Budapest: Argumentum Kiadó, 2012).  
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dictatorship). This is definitely true if  the research approaches the events of  
1956 from the perspective of  democratic values. In modern times, according to 
Hannah Arendt, we can give meaning to our own time by regaining the past. The 
pearl diver does not dive to the bottom of  the sea to discover everything that 
is there; he is only interested in pearls and coral.9 This applies even if  she sets 
out to present nearly every phenomenon, including those less important for her 
own interpretation.
According to Arendt’s theory of  totalitarianism, terror is a phenomenon 
that pervades every aspect of  social life. In this interpretation, terror is actually 
the trigger of  social resistance and revolution (true also for 1956). The question 
remains of  how to explain how a totalitarian system can survive for a long time, 
i.e. why it does not prompt members of  society to form groups for collective 
action.10 This, or how the totalitarian system built itself  into the everyday world, 
is really the central question of  the historiography of  the Kádár era.
The nature and operation of  Kádárism, the new order which was set up in 
Hungary to stifle the democratic initiatives of  1956, is the subject of  the book by 
János Rainer M. The essays making up Bevezetés a kádárizmusba extend their scope 
to the preceding Rákosi era and the subsequent political transition. Rainer claims 
that Stalinism and the Rákosi era did not break down every social tradition in 
Hungary, and the Kádár era made fewer changes to the Stalinist system after 
1956 than contemporary discourses might lead us to think. The center of  the 
author’s interest, as implied by the title, is the assessment and interpretation of  
the Kádár era and Kádárism.
The book reflects on the best-known foreign interpretations of  the state 
socialist system, theories of  totalitarianism, various schools of  revisionism, and 
interpretations of  Stalinism as a civilization. Rainer notes that “the paradigm 
of  ‘totalitarianism’ was to no small extent reborn in Eastern Europe before 
and after 1989” (p.125). It is difficult, however, to judge the validity of  theory 
from what are often purely ideological applications of  it; the oversimplifying 
interpretations are usually what the revisionists turn against (p.49). In Hungary, 
the totalitarianism paradigm is usually taken up together with right-wing, highly 
9  “Like a pearl diver who descends to the bottom of  the sea, not to excavate the bottom and bring it 
to light but to pry loose the rich and the strange, the pearls and the coral in the depths, and to carry them 
to the surface, this thinking delves into the depths of  the past—but not in order to resuscitate it the way 
it was and to contribute to the renewal of  extinct ages.” Hannah Arendt, “Introduction,” in idem, ed., 
Illuminations, essays by Walter Benjamin (New York: Schocken, 1969), 50–51.
10  Hannah Arendt, The Origins of  Totalitarianism (New York: Meridian Books, 1958), 498.
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ideologized anti-Communist rhetoric. Nowadays, however, we see these systems 
as being as open to left-wing criticism (indeed in a democracy they can only 
be approached critically) as Western capitalism, and even some elements of  
totalitarianism theory fit into this criticism. The author, in the restrained tones 
of  these essays, implies that he finds the best route to interpreting the Kádár era 
through methodological multiplicity and a combination of  approaches, and that 
is what he tries to do in this book.
For a long time, the “Kádár system” appeared in both Western and 
Hungarian historiography as a version of  state socialism with a special human 
face, approaching Western welfare states, a system which made Central and 
Eastern European totalitarianism liveable, and in fact fundamentally changed 
it (taming the system from arbitrary and totalitarian to merely authoritarian). 
Rainer claims that Kádárism was not a system in its own right, but only a shift 
within the system. These internal changes did, however, combine into some kind 
of  organic whole which might be called Kádárism, a liveable system for a large 
proportion of  ordinary people. The author argues that Kádárism was not as 
different from the previous era as the contemporary discourses legitimating the 
rule of  János Kádár, and hence today’s discourses, would have it. It is striking, 
for example, that the word “reform”, regarded in both Hungary and abroad as 
a uniquely applicable to the system, was almost never used in a positive sense by 
Kádár himself  (p.185–86). 
In analyzing the essence of  Kádárism, Rainer mentions a “Kádárist feeling” 
(p.146). He claims this derived not only from the sure knowledge that the country 
was “the best of  existing worlds”, but also from the sense that everything could 
get worse (and only worse) at any time. He uses this as the general explanation 
for how the new regime managed to consolidate after the bloody reprisals. The 
author highlights the eponymous leader’s cynicism (p.27), which was perhaps 
not so much cynicism as the—not necessarily always conscious—recognition of  
public expectations, the day-to-day bounds of  dictatorship and the limitations 
of  rule. The author characterizes Kádár, who openly distanced himself  from his 
predecessors, as not being associated with personal cult (p.200–14). He implies 
that the party leader’s behavior also contributed to the consolidation of  the state 
system after its violent restoration. The question remains, however, as to how 
much this consolidation was directed from above and how much it derived from 
the will and deliberate action of  a leader who seemed (and presented himself  
as) different from the other state-socialist leaders. In the revisionist approach, 
this could much better be interpreted as a jointly-developed social practice to 
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which the First Secretary adapted than as a compromise between “regime” and 
“society”.
Individuals do not simply subordinate themselves to state power in a 
dictatorship, but by their actions they accept, transform and—in their own 
everyday worlds—even create it. State power to some extent depends on the 
character and actions of  its citizens/subjects. It follows from the work of  
revisionist historians who adopt Foucault’s concepts of  power that we can get 
close to understanding the system via the collective and individual actions which 
enable it to operate. Stephen Kotkin claims that “Stalinism was not just a political 
system, let alone the rule of  an individual. It was a set of  values, a social identity, a 
way of  life. When it comes to Stalinism, what needs to be explained and subjected 
to detailed scrutiny are the mechanisms by which the dreams of  ordinary people 
and those of  the individuals directing the state found common ground in this 
Soviet version of  the welfare state.”11 The same might be said of  totalitarianism 
in general, and the approach does not actually contradict the essential claims 
of  totalitarianism theories (which link the substance of  dictatorship to modern 
forms of  violence) but examines the everyday implementation of  totalitarianism 
and seeks the explanation of  the sustained existence of  totalitarian systems in 
the world of  everyday life.
What ordinary people actually got from Kádárism, and what compromises 
or everyday practices confirmed the system’s legitimacy in the Kádár era, are 
fundamental questions. The discourses of  the period hold that the system, starting 
in the 1960s, created rising standards of  living and relative welfare in Hungary 
(Rainer also mentions the complex relationship between these discourses and 
everyday realities). Recent research, however (books by Béla Tomka and Sándor 
Horváth) largely refute this.12 This work no longer looks to the other countries 
of  the Soviet system for a basis of  comparison but to Western democratic social 
policy, whose fundamental aims diverged from those the social system built up 
in Hungary after 1956. Hungarian social policy was aimed at legitimizing state 
institutions, the state, and even the social system itself. It was a system which 
11  Stephen Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization (Berkeley: University of  California Press, 
1995), 23.
12  Béla Tomka, Welfare in East and West: The Hungarian Welfare State in an International Comparison, 1918–1990 
(Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2003). Béla Tomka: Szociálpolitika a 20. századi Magyarországon európai perspektívában 
[Social Policy in Twentieth-Century Hungary in a European Perspective] (Budapest: Századvég, 2003); 
Sándor Horváth, Két emelet boldogság. Mindennapi szociálpolitika Budapesten a Kádár-korban [Happiness on Two 
Storeys. Everyday Social Policy in Budapest in the Kádár Era] (Budapest: Napvilág Kiadó, 2012).
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gave no opening for real representation of  interests, and especially not public 
collective representation.
According to Kotkin, what emerged under state socialist regimes was an 
“uncivil society”. The establishment was the only formation which was a real 
organized unit (set against unorganized groupings).13 The contemporary elite 
and bureaucracy, through their organization and their positions within society, 
thus arranged the systems of  distribution to operate according to their interests. 
The uncivil logic, i.e. the lack of  autonomy and solidarity and the imposition of  
narrow interests ran through not only the old establishment (i.e. top down) but 
society as a whole (nearly everybody had something to lose). The paternalist 
policy ultimately proved successful because—until the nineteen eighties—
neither the social injustices nor any other cause triggered mass protests.14
Rainer’s book gives us a much more textured account of  the Kádár era and 
the operation of  the state socialist system in general than previous approaches, 
which confined themselves to political history. It challenges the assertions that 
the Kádár era can be sharply delineated from the Rákosi era and that the system’s 
internal changes during the period directly led to the political transition. This 
may encourage us to examine the state socialist system in Hungary as a separate 
civilization and its operation according to its own rules. If  we give up the notion 
of  all-embracing total power, we also have to reject the idea that dictatorship 
was driven initially purely by violence and later by compromises offered by the 
regime. Nonetheless, we are left with the question of  why the society that was 
the champion of  freedom in 1956 (in its own and the world’s eyes) uniformly 
accepted—or seemed to accept—the framework and existence of  the state 
socialist system. Viewed from close up, how can we explain the phenomenon 
Rainer calls the “Kádárist feeling”?
Today, it seems that consolidating state socialism, after the feeling of  
permanent threat and vulnerability of  the period of  catastrophe and the 
Rákosi era, created a kind of  peaceful opportunism in Hungary. After 1956, 
the unalterability of  the system (and the need for collaboration/cooperation 
with the regime) did indeed seem to become a general awareness, or almost a 
shared attitude to life. A basic question in this regard is whether individual and 
collective anger against the system existed or could have existed in the Kádár era, 
and if  so, in what form. Another question is how these behaviors relate to the 
13  Stephen Kotkin (with a contribution by Jan T. Gross), Uncivil Society. 1989 and the Implosion of  the 
Communist Establishment (New York: Modern Library, 2009).
14  Horváth, Két emelet boldogság, 242.
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individual and collective behaviors seen in 1956. In my view, two social science 
concepts could be adapted to interpret the formation and everyday working of  
Kádárism, and they cannot be understood solely by the theoretical models of  
totalitarianism.
German historians of  everyday life developed a highly influential theory 
to describe the legitimacy of  dictatorships and the effect and significance of  
individual actions in these regimes. This theory borrows from German literature 
and philosophy the concept of  Eigensinn (“sense of  one’s own interests”) 
to describe the behavior and motivations of  the “majority”, i.e. people who 
were neither enthusiastic disciples nor active opponents of  the Nazi or Soviet 
dictatorships but whose everyday work and passive behavior, by not presenting 
resistance, helped these systems to build up and endure. The word implies a kind 
of  self-sufficiency and independence; not the free will of  free persons, but the 
will of  citizens who can (and do) adapt to various kinds of  regime while keeping 
their own direct interests in view.15 Set against this is the concept of  autonomy, 
the kind of  everyday behavior which inhibits the emergence and persistence of  
totalitarianism and which should, in principle, be typical behavior in a democracy. 
Whether it is democracy which creates autonomous behavior, and dictatorship 
which creates Eigensinn and everyday forms of  collaboration, or these things 
happen the other way round, is a complex question, and the perspective of  study 
obviously has a bearing on the answer. 
The social sciences, following Nietzsche,16 use the term ressentiment to denote 
the impotent vengeance and collective passions aroused in ordinary people by 
15  On the Eigensinn concept, see Alf  Lüdtke, “Geschichte und ‘Eigensinn’” in Alltagskultur, Subjektivität 
und Geschichte. Zur Theorie und Praxis von Alltagsgeschichte, ed. Berliner Geschichtswerkstatt (Münster: Berliner 
Geschichtswerkstatt, 1994), 139–53.
16  Friedrich Nietzsche, On The Genealogy of  Morals, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1969). 
The historical adaptations of  the concept: Robert C. Solomon explains the English expression resentment 
as always being directed to people of  higher rank, anger to those of  the same rank, and contempt to 
those of  lower rank. Robert Solomon, “One Hundred Years of  Ressentiment: Nietzsche’s Genealogy 
of  Morals,” in Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality: Essays on Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of  Morals, ed. Richard 
Schacht (Berkeley: University of  California Press, 1994), 95–126.  In one of  Sheila Fitzpatrick’s essays, 
following Arno Mayers’ study of  revolutionary violence—Arno Mayers, The Furies: Violence and Terror in the 
French and Russian Revolutions (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001)—she analyzes the role of  
vengeance and ressentiment in the Russian Revolution, by which she means the four decades of  Soviet history 
following 1917. This ascribes the main driving force of  the series of  events labelled “the revolution to the 
resentment of  everyday people. The collective anger of  the mass was directed at the bourgeois elites at 
the beginning of  the revolution, the Russian intellectuals in the late 1920s, the Communist administrative 
elite (or bureaucracy) by the late 1930s, and the Jews by the late 1940s and early 1950s. Sheila Fitzpatrick, 
“Vengeance and Ressentiment in the Russian Revolution,” French Historical Studies 24 (2001): 579–88.
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unjustly inflicted injuries and expressed in terms of  justice or their own sense 
of  “right”. This is violently suppressed resistance, the post-terror condition, the 
forced renunciation of  resistance. At such times, ordinary people—having no 
defeatable opponent or space for real action—become incapable of  resistance. 
The actions of  individuals thus serve purely their own personal interests and act 
against, and restrict, each other. Today, we do not look back on these individual 
and collective authoritative behaviors as revealing aspects of  the past or points 
of  reference (going back to the pearl-diver metaphor: as pearls or coral), but 
they may nonetheless have been important driving forces behind the events. 
In the Kádár era, the majority were not true disciples of  the dictatorship, but 
neither were they its opponents. As simple citizens, they adapted to it because 
they were concerned with their own interests. These were the behaviors that 
may have created “Kádárism” in everyday life. It was in the basic interests of  
the new regime that the party leadership not be the target of  suppressed or 
repressed resentments, and that people should seek the enemy in invisible forces 
or external, occupying powers. Nearly every symbolic act of  the era’s eponym 
(who retained a long grip on power) was directed at having the truly suppressed 
groups of  society see him as a man of  ressentiment, someone who really was no 
different from them, the ordinary people, and who represented their interests.17 
Totalitarian systems have given rise to innumerable forms of  collaboration, and 
the concepts of  terror and resistance in themselves are insufficient to explain 
them, in Hungary as elsewhere. What made the Kádár era? Very briefly, a 
social need for it in the prevailing conditions of  dictatorship; this is one of  the 
uncomfortable lessons of  studying “Kádárism”.
Translated by Alan Campbell
György Majtényi
17  An adaptation of  the concept of  ressentiment to the Kádár era: György Majtényi, Vezércsel. Kádár 
János mindennapjai [Queen’s Gambit. The Everyday Life of  János Kádár] (Budapest: Libri Kiadó–Magyar 
Nemzeti Levéltár, 2012).
